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Abstract 
Effective Market Discipline (MD) has been puzzling financial economists and regulators for decades, while the recent bail-in 
legislation for European banks strongly increases the need for even stricter MD. It may not be an exaggeration when we say that a 
new regime for the European banking market has been created after the aforementioned decision. This paper’s objective is the 
broader examination of MD, using variables that are not usually included in MD studies, but concern the European Union (EU) 
and the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the past few years. In particular, apart from banking, deposit insurance and pure 
macroeconomic indicators, we also include governance and sovereign debt indices. The new regime may need a new MD 
approach. We choose Greece to implement our assumptions, because it is the country with the most severe economic, sovereign 
and governance problems in the EU. We employ data for the period 2002-10. The empirical evidence supports that market 
discipline is superficial, while there is ample evidence that MD is directly influenced by the poor governance performance and the 
excessive government debt. Greek authorities have to make major structural reforms in order to create the conditions for long-term 
stability, while our analysis points out some of the EMU’s shortfalls. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Market Discipline (MD) is generally considered by regulators (Basel II) and researchers (Cubillas et al, 2012) as a 
principle of limiting bank risk-shifting incentives that are exacerbated by financial safety nets. For this reason in the 
past decades the literature on the specific area of study raises significantly. So, a first question we may have to 
address is “why would another MD study would be important at this moment?” It is the recent Eurogroup’s decision 
according to which a bail-in would be one of the main resolution measures, that bears a new regime for the European 
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banking industry (Council of the European Parliament, 2013). After this decision, depositors should scrutinise the 
financial institutions (FI) in which they entrust their money. From that point onwards, deposits that are more than 
€100,000 per depositor are not considered as savings, but as investments. The new regime forces depositors towards a 
stronger MD. This study tries (i) to present a broader MD approach, which is consistent to the recent socio-economic 
reality, (ii) to note some drawbacks in the institutional framework, and (iii) to suggest some possible resolution 
measures.   
Τhere is a vast literature, which may be classified into two groups. The first group examines if there is market 
discipline in a particular country during a given period (single country studies), and the second one examines how 
several structural characteristics influence MD and financial stability using data from a group of countries (cross 
country studies).   
Most of the single country studies are mainly centered on the effects that the establishment of a Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (DIS) or the changes in the DIS’s coverage guarantee have on MD. Below we present some of the most 
important studies in order (i) to stress the worldwide interest on this area of study, and (ii) to briefly present some of 
the most significant empirical findings that will be useful to our analysis.  
Kane (1989) states that some of the most significant reasons that led to the Savings and Loan Crisis of 1990 are the 
US financial safety net, the fixed-rate deposit insurance and the delayed closure of the banks. Imai (2006) uses the 
deposit insurance reform in Japan as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance 
coverage and market discipline. His results suggest that limitation of deposit coverage enhances market discipline. 
De Long and Saunders (2011) using data from 60 Financial Institutions (FIs) find that banks and trusts in general 
become more risky after the introduction of the federal DIS. Also, they prove that DIS reduces the depositors’ 
discipline. Similarly, Mondschen and Opelia (1999) find that with the adoption of DIS in Poland, bank specific 
variables become less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. Ioannidou and Dreu (2006) 
studying the banking system in Bolivia, show that the establishment of deposit insurance causes a significant 
reduction in market discipline.  
In contrast to the previously mentioned papers, Peria and Schmulker (2001) suggest that there is MD in Argentina, 
Chile and Mexico where depositors penalise the banks by undertaking high risks. A general observation from the 
literature review may be that DIS seems to have negative effects on MD. 
Regarding the second sub-group, most of the cross section studies examine several other factors’ influence on MD 
and on financial stability. Basel II (pillar III) stresses that MD is one of the two main tools, which improve bank 
stability. The other tool is the supervision (pillar II), whose effects are mainly analysed in cross country studies. In 
these studies scholars suggest that MD effectiveness varies across countries due to particular structural features, such 
as the Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS), the institutional environment, supervision etc. and how MD influences 
financial stability. Below, we present some of the most important findings of the cross section studies. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) prove that the explicit DIS reduces the depositors’ MD. Hovakimian et al 
(2003) show that through DIS a bank transfers the risk it undertakes to its depositors, but this mainly happens in 
countries with weak banking institutions. However, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002b) state this does not mean 
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that countries with explicit DISs should close them down. The well-designed DIS and its continuous re-adaption may 
be the best solution. There are several DIS characteristics that reduce the DIS drawbacks and strengthen the 
depositors MD, such as co-insurance and risk-based premiums (Hovakimian et al, 2003).  
Generally, the success of the DIS depends on the quality of the supervisory and the institutional framework as well. 
Cull et al (2005) notice that DIS has negative consequences for the financial development in the long run, except if it 
refers to countries with strong legal and supervisory framework.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002a) indicate 
that the explicit DIS, the high DIS coverage and the weak institutional environment increase the likelihood of a 
financial crisis. Hardy and Nieto (2011) conclude that the optimal tightness of the level of prudential regulation, 
supervision and enforcement is linked to DIS in a trade off way.  
The DIS effectiveness is influenced even by its authorization within the banking system. Beck and Laeven (2008) 
empirically prove that the involvement of the deposit insurer in bank failure resolution stabilizes the banking system 
and reduces the negative effect that deposit insurance has on banks’ risk taking. The main explanation for this is that 
the deposit insurer will have to pay the losses; therefore he needs to implement the corrective measures on time. 
As we present above, the single country analysis has some limits to the potential findings that cross country studies 
do not. This paper tries to include in a single country’s MD study, variables that usually could be used in cross 
sectional analysis (e.g. DIS coverage index, governance indicators and sovereign risk) in order to “merge” the two 
methodological approaches and to include in the MD study some of the most severe issues that puzzle Greece, the 
Europrean Monetary Union (EMU) and the EU.  
International literature presents increased interest on the effect of specific governance indicators on banking and 
economic growth. Park (2012) suggests that corruption distorts bank funds allocation from normal projects to bad 
projects, which not only decreases the banks’ loans quality, but also leads to non-productive private investments that 
decrease the economic growth. Mauro (1995), in contrast to Park (2012), mentions that corruption reduces the amount 
of private investments and functions as tax on investments. . In any case, the existence of corruption only has 
negative consequences in the long run for economic performance. Our study, apart from corruption, also tries to 
include a set of governance indicators in MD.   
This research tries to include all the aforementioned findings in a single study that investigates the Greek bank market 
during the period 2002-10. We choose to apply our assumptions to the Greek case, because the “Greek issue” has 
been puzzling the EU authorities since 2010, the year in which the Greek government officially asks for financial aid. 
In the next section we present the Greek socioeconomic environment, but at this point it may be useful to mention 
that during the end of 2010 and in the beginning of 2011 the movement of capital from Greece to other countries 
commences due to the increased sovereign risk. The fear of the country’s bankruptcy may significantly influence the 
depositors’ decisions; therefore their MD behaviour over the next years may be influenced by the sovereign risk. This 
is the reason we assume that the Greek crisis begins in 2011 (or in late 2010) and the main reason we do not use data 
from later years. The fear of sovereign risk should be included in the depositors’ decision, so we include the public 
debt in our modeling to examine how it influences the depositors’ behaviour during “normal times”.  
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Regarding this study’s methodology, we use several panel data models (pooled, fixed and random effects) as the 
relative literature suggests, but our final choice is the random effects model, because the interest is not the value of 
the unobserved bank-specific effect for a particular bank, but the conclusions in relation to population characteristics’.  
This paper contributes to the MD literature by (i) examining the MD in the Greek banking market for first time, (ii) 
including new variables, such as governance indicators and public debt, that have never been used in the MD 
empirical literature before, but represent major issues that concern the EU, (iii) proving with empirical results severe 
and long-term disabilities of the Greek governance system. Furthermore, from the empirical findings and the 
literature review, we suggest some measures that may strengthen the MD in order for similar problems in other 
countries (or in Greece) to be avoided in the future. This approach may constitute the basis for a new way of studying 
MD.   
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Greek socioeconomic 
environment. Section 3 describes the data, analyses the methodological issues and the variables. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Section 5 contains the concluding remarks and some policy implications. 
 
2. The Greek Socioeconomic Environment 
A second question we may need to answer is “what makes the Greek case so important or suitable to implement our 
assumptions?” In our opinion there are at least five reasons. Firstly, Greece is one of the twelve European countries 
that first adopted the Euro as its official currency in 2002 and, like the most countries, up to 2007 presented economic 
growth (Table 1). Secondly, Greece is the EU’s country that seems to be affected the most by the global crisis, since 
the General government’s gross debt as percentage of GDP (public debt) has increased considerably (Table 2), while 
it encounters the most long-standing recession (Table 1)
1
.  
Thirdly, the case of Greece is unique because in recent years a major European issue is whether Greece will stay or 
depart from the euro area and the contagion fears from a potential Greek sovereign default (Samitas and Tsakalos, 
2013). Fourthly, the Greek DIS’s main structural characteristics are: (i) it is explicit, (ii) banks pay flat premiums, (iii) 
there is no co-insurance, (iv) DIS has no right to control a financial institution (FI) or participate in settlement 
procedures and (v) the amount of DIS coverage per depositor in November 2008 was increased from €20,000 to 
€100,000. These characteristics are not in line with the results of the international empirical research (as presented in 
section1). 
 
Table 1 : Gross domestic product, current prices (Percent Change(%)) 
Gross domestic product, current prices (National currency) expressed in billions of national currency units. Expenditure-based 
GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices (including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and services), less the f.o.b. 
value of imports of goods and services. [SNA 1993]. Source IMF database.  
                                                          
1 We remind that the 2007’s global crisis affected the EU and the case of the so called P.I.I.G.S. (coming from the names of 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) emerges in 2008. In bold letters and numbers we indicate PIIGS public debt. 
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Table 2: General government gross debt Percentage of GDP (%) 
Definition: Public debt is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as consolidated general government gross debt at nominal value, 
outstanding at the end of the year. The general government sector comprises central government, state government, local 
government, and social security funds. The relevant definitions are provided in Council Regulation 479/2009, as amended by 
Council Regulation 679/2010. Data for the general government sector are consolidated between sub-sectors at the national level. 
The series are measured in euro and presented as a percentage of GDP. 
Country/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 66.2 65.3 64.7 64.2 62.3 60.2 63.8 69.5 71.9 72.2 
Belgium 103.4 98.4 94.0 92.0 88.0 84.1 89.3 95.8 96.0 98.0 
Finland 41.5 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.6 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.4 48.6 
France 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 85.8 
Germany 60.7 64.4 66.3 68.6 68.1 65.2 66.7 74.4 83.0 81.2 
Greece 101.7 97.4 98.6 100 106.1 107.4 113 129.4 145 165.3 
Ireland 31.9 30.7 29.4 27.2 24.7 24.8 44.2 65.1 92.5 108.2 
Italy 105.1 103.9 103.4 105.4 106.1 103.1 105.7 116.0 118.6 120.1 
Luxembourg 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.7 13.7 14.8 19.1 18.2 
Netherlands 50.5 52.0 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.3 58.5 60.8 62.9 65.2 
Portugal 53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 63.9 68.3 71.6 83.1 93.3 107.8 
Spain 52.6 48.8 46.3 43.1 39.6 36.2 40.2 53.9 61.2 68.5 
Source: Eurostat 
Fifthly, several governance pathogenesis of the past were revealed
2
 in Greece throughout the past few years. We 
briefly mention two representative examples of the pathogenesis: the first for the Greek banking system and the 
second for the state’s governance.  
                                                          
2 This started especially, after the Greek Prime Minister’s, Mr. G. Papandreou, announcement on April 23rd, 2010 that Greece 
requests for entrance in the European Stability Mechanism. Moreover, The Greek pathogenesis can be presented numerically. 
According to the World Bank Database (Kaufman et al (2010)), Greece (and Italy) is at the bottom of the rankings among EU 
countries in the governance indicators we use in our study. Also, the Greek governance performance is declining especially after 
2004. The only indicators in which has satisfied performance is the Regulatory Quality (Figure 1). These data are available upon 
request.  
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 1.694 0.866 2.59 2.401 3.67 3.706 1.396 -3.81 2.315 3.107 0.937 
Belgium 1.359 0.807 3.269 1.731 2.702 2.9 0.957 -2.841 2.266 1.893 0.007 
Finland 1.834 2.012 4.126 2.915 4.411 5.335 0.294 -8.354 3.732 2.855 0.583 
France 0.944 0.889 2.346 1.868 2.658 2.234 -0.196 -2.631 1.382 1.715 0.476 
Germany 0.025 -0.385 0.702 0.833 3.889 3.394 0.809 -5.078 3.562 3.056 0.615 
Greece 3.439 5.944 4.367 2.281 4.614 3.032 -0.137 -3.258 -3.507 -6.86 -4.749 
Ireland 5.874 4.159 4.508 5.34 5.312 5.182 -2.972 -6.995 -0.43 0.705 0.521 
Italy 0.451 -0.047 1.731 0.931 2.199 1.683 -1.156 -5.494 1.804 0.431 -1.907 
Luxembourg 4.103 1.545 4.398 5.43 4.969 6.639 0.754 -5.3 2.678 1.004 -0.228 
Netherlands 0.076 0.336 2.237 2.046 3.394 3.921 1.804 -3.479 1.633 1.266 -0.5 
Portugal 0.764 -0.911 1.56 0.775 1.448 2.365 -0.008 -2.908 1.383 -1.466 -3.252 
Spain 2.736 3.091 3.257 3.585 4.077 3.479 0.888 -3.74 -0.07 0.71 -1.826 
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In the context of the Greek banking system, the Bank of Greece (BoG) is responsible for the prudential supervision of 
credit and financial institutions, with a view to ensure the smooth operation and stability of the Greek financial system.   
The BoG has the authority to perform on-site and off-site controls, but: (i) there is no a specific methodology for the 
controls, (ii) the mandatory frequency for these controls is not specified, and (iii) these controls’ results are never 
released. These deficiencies in the institutional framework may lead to ineffective controls and increased bank opacity, 
which impair depositors’ ability to discipline banks.  
Regarding the state’s governance, the statement of the Greek deputy Prime Minister Mr. Th. Pangalos that “…we 
(meaning government and citizens) squandered away the money together” tersely presents that there was 
misappropriation of the Greek state’s funds, which led to the excessive public debt and eventually the country to the 
verge of bankruptcy. This statement confirms that the Greek state has long suffered from problems, such as political 
clientelism, affecting its institutional capability. (Featherstone, 2005; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2009; Moutos and 
Tsitikas,2010). 
Rule of Law (RL) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory 
Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Aggregate Governance Indicator is the average value 
of the aforementioned indicators among all countries. 
 
Figure 1: Greek Governance Performance 
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Finally, we need to state the reasons we use 2002-10 data.  Data start in 2002, which is the year that Greece adopted 
the Euro as its official currency and ends in 2010, because post-2010 reports in domestic and international press 
concerning the country’s exit from euro (“Grexit”) were increased significantly. Under these conditions the flight of 
capitals begins at the end of 2010 and increases at the upcoming period (Figure 2
3
). The depositors took in 
consideration factors such as the fear of bankruptcy and the “Grexit” that did not exist during the previous years. 
Besides, our goal is to examine MD in normal times, because the main safety nets’ trade off is between the DIS 
efficiency during banking crisis and the moral hazard, which grows during the normal times (Hardy and Nieto, 2011).  
 
Figure 2: Households, nonprofit institutions serving households and non-financial corporations' deposits during the 
2003-13 period (in billions) 
 
Source :ECB’s database 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study combines: (i) bank-level, (ii) macroeconomic (iii) institutional (DIS) and (iv) governance data for the 
period 2002-10. The data used in this paper regarding the Greek bank fundamentals are mainly collected from 
Thomson Reuters and supplementary from each banks publicly available statement. The sample includes annual data 
from the following banks: Agricultural, Alpha bank, Attica, EFG Eurobank, Emporiki, Geniki, Marfin, National 
Bank, Piraeus, Proton Bank, T-Bank, TT Hellenic Post Bank.  According to ECB the 5 biggest banks of the country, 
which are included in our sample, hold more than 70% of the deposits, therefore is representative of the Greek 
                                                          
3 The figure2 presents data for households, nonprofit institutions serving households and non-financial corporations’ deposits, 
because these are the economy’s primarly lenders (Allen et al (2004)).     
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banking market
4
. All the banking variables are introduced with a lag of one period, except the Log of total assets in 
order to dynamically introduce the “Too Big To Fail Theory (TBTF)”.  The GDP growth rates and GDP per capita are 
collected from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (El.Stat.), inflation from the International Monentary Fund data base, 
T-bill interest rates
5
 from Bank of Greece (BoG) and the DIS coverage amount from the Hellenic Deposit & 
Investment Guarantee Fund (HDIGF). The data concerning governance indicators are drawn from the database of the 
World Bank (Kaufman et al, 2010) and finally the Public Debt from Eurostat.  
3.2 Methodological issues 
In MD literature several panel data estimation methods are used. We employ several panel data models (pooled, fixed 
and random effects). We end with the random effects model, because we are interested in making inferences with 
respect to the population’s characteristics and we are not interested in the value of the unobserved bank-specific effect 
(μi) for a particular banking market (De Haas and Lelyeued, 2006)
6
. Moreover, Hausman test results confirm the 
appropriateness of the random effects methodological approach. 
In the first stage we run a regression using the independent variables that are mainly used in a MD research (bank 
ratios, inflation, DIS and GDP Growth). Then, we individually add each Governance Indicator (GI)
7
 in order to 
examine their influence on MD. In the last part of our empirical results we run regressions using an aggregate 
governance indicator (AGI), because governance performance (in total) cannot be captured by a single factor. Finally, 
we add the public debt ratio to include the sovereign risk in our model.   
The final model to be used for the calculation of the interest rate is the following  
 
   Interest ratei,t = ai,t + Bank Fundamentalsi,t-1+ Macroeconomic Variablesi,t +  
DIS Variablei,t + Governance Indicatori,t + μi+ εi,t………………………………………………………………………………………………………………(1) 
 
where i= 1,…,N are data for every bank and t=1,…, T is the period of time. The panel is unbalanced. The vectors of 
bank risk characteristics, Bank Fundamentalsi,t-1, Macroeconomic Variablesi,t, DIS Variablei,t  and Governance 
Indicatori,t are described in the next paragraphs. μi is the unobserved, panel-level random effect, μi~ IID(0,σμ
2
) and εi,t 
is the idiosyncratic error, εit ~ IID(0,σε
2
). 
As far as the deposits is concerned, the model is as below 
ΔDepositsi,t =  ai,t + Bank Fundamentalsi,t-1 + Macroeconomic Variablesi,t  
 + DIS Variablei,t+ Governance Indicatori,t  + μi+εi,t       …………………………………………………………………………….(2) 
,where ΔDepositsi,t is the annual percentage change in total deposits. 
                                                          
4 These data are available upon request. 
5 Whether we use the 12 months T-bills rate or the a mixed T-bills rate from different durations the results are similar.  We present 
the results using the mixed durations T-bills rates because they present increased frequency, therefore may better show the risk free 
rate through the whole year.    
6 We have applied panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates, white period and the white cross-section coefficient 
covariance method, but the estimates did not differ substantially as regards economic and statistical significance of individual 
coefficients.  
7 The set of the GIs includes the Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality and Government Effectiveness indicators.  
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For the interest rate depended variable we use the interest rate paid by the bank minus the T-Bills rate to obtain a time 
series measure of bank risk that is adjusted for the nominal riskless rate (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
Moreover, by subtracting the T-bills rate from the bank rates we immunize the bank’s risk premium from the T-bills 
rate, which may be influenced from the country’s sovereign risk.  
In the rest of this section we analyze the variables that we use in our model. 
3.3 Variables 
In order to measure the bank risk, we calculate a number of accounting ratios that are publicly available and are akin 
to those used in the CAMEL rating system (Peria and Schmulker (2001)). CAMEL stands for Capital, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings, Liquidity. The CAMEL’s usage enables us to quantify the respective banking risks and to 
avoid the danger of the banks’ balance-sheets opacity as much as possible. Moreover, from the statistical significance 
of each ratio’s coefficient we can conclude the indexes which the depositors pay more attention to, before doing their 
investments.  
Capital adequacy is measured by the Capital to Assets ratio (Cap), as in Peria and Schmulker (2001). The Cap should 
have negative influence towards the interest rate and positive towards the deposits. More specifically, the higher the 
capital adequacy of a bank is, the more secured should a depositor feel. The higher the capital adequacy should be the 
smaller risk premium concerning the price of the interest cost, while concerning the deposits it should be depicted 
with increased volume. 
There are many indicators that can be used to estimate asset quality. Ratios that are commonly used for the valuation 
of a bank’s quality assets are either the Non Performing Assets to Total Assets (NPA) or the Non Performing Loans 
to Total Loans (NPL). However, there is no adequate statistical data available for the period we examine. In order to 
overcome this particular problem we use the Provisions to Total Loans ratio (Prov). We use this specific index 
because (i) it can be easily drawn from the balance-sheet of a bank, in contrast to NPLs that appears in financial 
statements and (ii) increased NPLs should lead to increased provisions (Park (2012))
8
. The Prov should, in principle, 
have a positive relation towards the interest rate and a negative one towards the amount of deposits. Thus, in a high 
Prov, an increased interest rate should be demanded and fewer deposits be entrusted. We should underline that this 
index can be interpreted differently. Increased provisions may reveal a bank that is conservative and in time tries to 
reduce its credit risk. Hence, the sign should be negative towards the interest rate and positive towards the deposits. 
The Cost to Income ratio (C/I) indicates the management performance. If there are increased costs in relation to the 
total income, it may be an indication of ineffective cost management (personnel expenses, interest expenses etc.) that 
may pander the future profitability of the bank. The ineffective management may well influence both the interest rate 
(positively), and the deposits (negatively).  
ROA is an indicator of a bank’s overall profitability. It is normal for a depositor to have more confidence in a bank 
which is profitable; hence this index should function negatively towards the interest rate and positively towards the 
amount of deposits. 
                                                          
8 Provisions and Non-performing Loans for the specific period notice strong and positive relation (r=0.82). Data are available upon 
request.  
Vasileiou /International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 3, No 1, 2014  ISSN: 2147-4486 
94 
 
Loans to Deposits (LtD) is a liquidity index of “traditional banking intermediation”, since a bank should receive 
money from its depositors and proceed to the appropriate loans. Excessive leverage may cause serious problems for a 
bank’s viability, since it makes it vulnerable enough towards possible crisis that may lead to deposit outflows. So, this 
relation should be positive towards the interest rates and negative towards the amount of deposits. However, as 
Barajas and Steiner (2000) show during the normal times banks with increased leverage present increased profits, 
which increases the banks’ robustness. Under this assumption, the depositors may trust more of their funds in high 
leveraged banks, a behaviour that underestimates the liquidity risk. These contrasting assumptions indicate how 
ambiguous can the financial indicators can be. 
Finally, according to the bank ratios we add the logarithm of the total banks’ assets (LogA) (Ioannidou and Dreu, 
2006; Cubillas et al, 2012). The logarithm of assets enables us to include the too big to fail theory (TBTF) according 
to which regulators will save big banks in case of a crisis.  In principle, depositors should demand less interest rates 
and deposit more funds in big banks, but as Cubillas et al (2012) stress in some occasions, big banks may be more 
aggressive and pay higher deposit rates than small ones if they have better investment options than them. We use the 
LogA without one period lag in order to dynamically introduce the TBTF of each year. The information about the 
ratios have a year lag, but the bank growth could be directly known to the depositors through news, acquisitions, 
advertisements, new branches opening etc. and vice versa. Table 3 presents the average bank fundamentals per 
institution. 
Table 3: Average Bank Fundamentals 
 
Bank 
Interest 
Rate 
ΔDepos
its 
Capital 
to 
Total 
Assets 
Provisions to Total 
Loans 
Cost to 
Income ROA 
Loans to 
Deposits 
Log(Asse
ts) 
Agrotiki -0,0121 0,0616 0,0441 0,0082 0,7932 0,0019 0,9505 4,35 
Alpha -0,0078 0,0908 0,0576 0,0083 0,7078 0,0094 1,3707 4,67 
Attica 0,0028 0,1851 0,0743 0,0098 0,8903 0,0032 1,2761 3,49 
Euroban
k 
0,0245 0,1366 0,0644 0,0099 0,7737 0,0093 1,2588 4,71 
Emporiki -0,0055 -0,0056 0,0484 0,0126 0,8739 -0,0037 1,1523 4,35 
Geniki -0,0078 0,0569 0,0591 0,0176 0,9410 -0,0104 1,2687 3,59 
Marfin 0,0017 0,3251 0,0738 0,0072 0,8060 0,0052 1,1790 3,84 
National -0,0098 0,0525 0,0633 0,0068 0,7669 0,0100 0,8454 4,88 
Pireaus 0,0013 0,1718 0,0553 0,0069 0,7781 0,0080 1,3168 4,48 
Proton 0,0033 2,9485 0,2671 0,0078 0,7311 0,0206 1,2824 2,96 
T-Bank 0,0077 0,0827 0,0510 0,0043 0,9866 -0,0031 1,1323 3,35 
TT 
Hellenic 
Post 
Bank 
-0,0037 0,0798 0,0730 0,0055 0,7277 0,0118 0,6502 4,12 
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In order to include the safety net we use the DIS coverage amount per depositor
9
 as an indicator. In a theoretical basis 
the increase of the coverage should lead to a decrease of the interest rates and an increase on the deposits, because it 
works as a premium.   
We use GDP growth and inflation as macroeconomic variables as usually happens in this kind of research (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Dreu, 2006). Theoretically, GDP growth should reduce the interest rates and 
increase the deposits, because growth may be a sign for a robust country (reduced country risk). Generally, the 
opposite signs are expected for the inflation coefficients, because increased inflation risk reduces the real deposit 
return and if the depositors are not compensated for this, they try to find alternative investment opportunities. 
However, in this study the dependent variable is the interest rate minus the T-Bills rate, which means that inflation 
coefficient presents us if bank interest rates reflect inflation more/less than the government rates (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004). 
According to the governance we use a set of government indicators (GI) instead of a single one; because we try more 
completely to reflect the citizens’10 perceptions about their state and the quality of the institutional and supervisory 
framework. The GI set consists of: Control of Corruprtion (CC) Rule of Law (RL), Government Effectiveness (GE) 
and Regulatory Quality (RQ). The scaling indicates the higher the value, the better performance in the respective 
governance indicator. 
This is the first time that the set of the aforementioned governance indicators is included in a MD study, to the best of 
our knowledge. In order to present our assumptions for these variables coefficients we should provide some useful 
information about them. Table 4 reports the correlation matrix of the used indicators. From the results we should 
stress that CC, GE and the aggregate governance indicator (the average value of the four GI we use) are in almost 
perfect positive correlation. Moreover, results indicate a strong correlation of RL with the other indexes, while RQ 
has the weakest, but positive one. The Greek regulatory quality index is high enough, because Greece as an EU’s 
member should be in accordance with European directives. These results quantitatively confirm the political 
pathogenesis and the general perception which holds in Greece that laws do exist, what does not exist is the 
willingness to enforce them due to the increased corruption
11
.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 We run the regressions using not only the DIS coverage amount, but also DIS coverage index, which is the ratio of DIS coverage 
amount to GDP per capita. The results are similar and available upon request. 
10 Depositors and citizens usually are the same people. As we present in figure 1 the Greek deposits mainly come from the 
residents. We should mention that these indicators, from Kaufmann et al (2010),  are not specialised in banks, but (i) at least 
indirectly they can provide us the desired information and (ii) similar indeces are used in these studies. For example Park(2012) 
uses Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) to introduce the corruption. 
11 The Greek Prime Minister Mr. G. Papandreou characteristically states to some senior EU officials in December 2009 that he 
governed a corrupt country. 
(http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_27/11/2011_416649)  
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Table 4: Governance Indicators Correlation Matrix 2002-2012 
 Corruption Rule of Law Regulatory Quality Government Effectiveness Average 
Corruption 1     
Rule of Law 0.747 1    
Regulatory Quality 0.577 0.435 1   
Government Effectiveness 0.960 0.842 0.609 1  
Aggregate Governance Indicator 0.955 0.876 0.683 0.982 1 
Source: World Bank and Authors’ calculation 
* Aggregate Governance Indicator constitutes the average values of the total of all the governance indicators in ranking prices.  
**The results using the average values in absolute prices are similar.  
 
As we have already presented in the first section, increased corruption negatively influences the economic growth 
(Park, 2012; Mauro, 1995). All the governance indicator variables are positively correlated to each other, so they 
should influence the independent variables in the same direction. The better performance in these indicators should 
lead to a more robust economy. This assumption entitles us to assume that the higher governance indicators values 
(performance) should result in negative interest rate and positive deposit coefficients. An alternative hypothesis that 
points to the same conclusion is that low corruption and strong performance on government effectiveness (or GI in 
general) lead to increased non-performing loans/provisions and poor economic growth (Park, 2012).    
Before we present the empirical results section there is a detail in which we have to mention. According to Park 
(2012) the arithmetic value of governance indicators is inappropriate for time series data analysis. The main reason is 
the fact that the methodology is altered every year, so for example, the increase in the index price may not be 
accompanied by the respective performance’s improvement. We figured out the solution of the percentile ranking 
among all the countries. This way we have comparable, in time, results which come from the most updated 
methodology. However, through this methodological approach disadvantages may occur: We may not be able to 
know (i) if the increase is due to the improvement of the country or to the deterioration of the others and (ii) if the 
sample is not stable or complete thus altering the rank. In order to reply in such an counterargument we examine the 
correlation between the absolute and the ranking prices of these indicators for the years 2002-2010 (Table 5).  
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Table 5: Correlation between Governance Indicators’ estimates and percentile rank measures in period 2002-2010 
Correlation between estimates and percentile rank 2002-2010 
Corruption 0.9902 
Rule of Law 0.949878 
Regulatory Quality 0.836298 
Government Effectiveness 0.97388 
Aggregate Governance Indicator 0.971548 
Source: World Bank and Authors’ calculations 
* Aggregate Governance Indicator constitutes the average values of the total of all the governance indicators in ranking prices.  
**The results using the average values in absolute prices are similar.  
 
Judging from their high correlation we assume that the percentile change in each variable’s rank is highly connected 
to the corresponding variation in the absolute value. Consequently, the specific methodological approach is regarded 
as the best one possible, because it gives us the desired variables using a dynamic integration of the updated 
methodologies.   
Finally, we add the public debt, because after the outbreak of the global crisis, it has emerged as a key 
macroeconomic variable and it is interesting to test its influence on depositors MD. This variable is a sovereign risk 
indicator, so its coefficients should be negative in the deposits and positive in interest rates equation. 
In Table 6 we briefly present all the variables we use in this paper. We have to stress that we do not always use all the 
variables from each independent variable vector. The tables in each model explicitly show the used variables in each 
model.   
 
Table 6: Variables definitions 
6.1 Dependent Variables  
 
Ratio Definition What this ratio 
indicates 
Source 
Interest rate 
 
Bank risk that is 
adjusted for the 
nominal riskless rate 
Thomson Reuters 
and Bank of 
Greece 
ΔDeposits 
 
Percentage growth in 
real deposits 
Thomson Reuters 
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6.2 Independent Variables 
6.2.1: Banking Variables 
Ratio Definition What this ratio 
indicates 
Source 
Capital to 
Assets  
Capital Risk Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
Provisions 
to Total 
Loans 
 
Asset Quality 
Risk 
Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
Cost to 
Income   
Managements 
Risk 
Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
ROA 
 
Sustainable 
Earnings Risk  
Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
Loans to 
deposits 
 
Liquidity Risk Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
 Log(Assets) Log of Total Assets Too big to Fail 
Theory 
Thomson 
Reuters and 
authos’ 
calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vasileiou /International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 3, No 1, 2014  ISSN: 2147-4486 
99 
 
Table 6.2.2: Macroeconomic Variables 
Ratio Definition What this ratio indicates Source 
GDP Growth 
 
Country Risk Hellenic 
Statistical 
Authority 
Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices Inflation Risk IMF Data Base 
GDP per 
Capita 
 
 
Country Risk Hellenic 
Statistical 
Authority 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
General government gross debt Percentage of 
GDP (%) 
 
Sovereign Risk Eurostat 
 
Table 6.2.3: DIS Variables 
Ratio Definition What this ratio indicates Source 
DIS Coverage  Average DIS Coverage Amount 
per year 
Safety Net Hellenic Deposits & 
Investment Guarantee 
Fund (HDIGF) 
DIS Coverage 
Index 
 
Safety Net Hellenic Deposits & 
Investment Guarantee 
Fund (HDIGF) and 
Hellenic Statistical 
Authority 
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6.2.4 Governance Indicators 
Governance is defined as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.”  
Notes 
*The Indicators of each sub-category of Governance are indicated with the respective exponent. 
** Governance Indicators measures .The aggregate World Governance Indicators are measured in two ways:  
- Percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank) 
- Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
 
The contexts of this tables are copied from Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M., 2010 ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators : A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical 
Issues’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 
Ratio Definition 
Government Effectiveness 
(GE)b 
 
Ccaptures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) b 
 
Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
Rule of Law  
(RL) c 
 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of Corruption 
(CC)c 
 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
The presentation of the empirical results follows a gradual estimation procedure in order to examine the influence of 
each variable οn MD. The analysis is divided into three sub-sections. Initially, we examine MD using the economic 
variables that are usually used in the MD studies; therefore at this stage we exclude from the macroeconomic 
variables the public debt ratio. Afterwards we add the variables of the governance indicators and, finally, we include 
the public debt variable.  
We do not include the public debt variable in the first place in order to show the results using the traditional 
modelling. This way we try to stress that some “strange” primary results may be explained if we use some other 
variables and isolate the “bad timing” effect as we present below.   
 
4.1 Market Discipline analysis using only Economic Variables (except the Public Debt Ratio) 
In the first subsection we examine MD using the variables that are often used in the literature. These primary results 
are displayed in table 7. 
Table 7: Basic model of the Market Discipline 
Variables 
Model 1 
Interest Rate  ΔDeposits 
Capital to Assets -0.069561 (0.0026)* 20.2289 (0.0000)* 
Provisions to Total Loans -0.402433 (0.0131)* 18.41121 (0.1922) 
Cost to Income 0.045188 (0.0000)* 2.589829 (0.1330) 
ROA 0.214950 (0.2756) 16.9749 (0.3648) 
Loan to Deposits 0.000836 (0.8067) 1.122358 (0.0000)* 
Log(Assets) 0.001897 (0.4782) 0.482626 (0.0877)*** 
DIS Coverage -7.43E-05 (0.2910) -0.005212 (0.4049) 
GDP Growth -0.053003 (0.3940) 0.185800  (0.9703) 
Inflation -0.589994 (0.0000)* -17.36524 (0.0433)* 
Constant -0.007900 (0.1972) 5.236530 (0.0090)* 
Number of Observations 104 103 
R-squared 0.518966 0.842189 
Durbin Watson 1.818* 1.985* 
Hausman Test 1.0000 1.0000 
Notes: *,**,*** level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Random effects (white-cross section standard errors 
& covariance (d.f. corrected). Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 
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In parentheses under the coefficient estimates we present p-values in order to give more information about their 
significance in the depositors’ final choice. Moreover, to make the results’ discussion easier we present in table 8 the 
expected results and the empirical findings of the bank ratios coefficients. This way we are able to focus on the 
economic comments of these findings. Moreover, the results of the banking variables variables set are steady (there 
are only small changes for the statistical significance) and for this reason we do not repeat our comments for them in 
the next sub-sections.   
 
Table 8: Expected results and empirical findings on bank ratios’ coefficients 
This table presents the expected results and the study’s empirical findings regarding the bank ratios’ coefficients. The 
* indicates statistical significance up to 10%. The conclusion column briefly comments the (in)consistence according 
to the MD theory. If the results are not clear this means that they may be influenced by increased deposits or the 
interest rates equation. 
Ratio Expected Empirical Findings Conclusion 
Interest Rates ΔDeposits Interest Rates ΔDeposits Consistent or not to 
MD 
Capital to Assets - + -* +* Consistent 
Provisions to 
Total Loans 
+ - -* + Inconsistent 
Cost to Income + - +* +* Not Clear results 
ROA - + + + Not Clear results 
Loan to Deposits + - + +* Not Clear results 
Log(Assets) - + - +* Consistent 
 
Findings support that in practice, Greek depositors trust the well capitalized and large banks. According to the other 
aspects of MD (management, profitability and liquidity) we do not have clear results on whether the depositors 
punish the banks which take excessive risks. The C/I indicators suggest positive and statistically significant 
coefficients in both equations, which may mean that depositors are influenced by the increased interest rates, or they 
trust the Greek banking system (or both of them) and they deposit increased fund in it. The Liquidity ratios are 
positive and statistically significant in the deposits equation, which means that depositors trust the high leveraged 
banks, however they are not compensated enough (positive but not statistically significant coefficients in the interest 
rates equation) or they underestimate the liquidity risk. Therefore the Barajas and Steiner (2000) assumptions and 
results may hold for the Greek case. The ROA is almost statistically significant in the deposits equation, a behaviour 
which is line with the MD assumptions. In this point we should mention that the ROA coefficients in the interest rate 
equations are positive, but not statistically significant, viz the opposite than the expected coefficient. All these results 
indicate a superficial MD.  
As far as the bank indicators are concerned, we have left the Prov. comments for the end, because its results may be 
unclear. As far as the interest rated is concerned, it is introduced with negative coefficient and statistical significance, 
which means that Greek depositors respect banks that declare increased provisions and are compensate from them 
with lower interest rates. Due to the deposits side prov. gives positive, but statistically slightly insignificant 
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coefficient, which partly confirms the assumption that depositors trust banks which make provisions to protect their 
loan portfolio from bad loans. On the other hand, if Park’s (2012) assumption holds, which seems to be confirmed in 
the Greek case (note 8), so there is no MD according to the provisions ratio
12
.   
The DIS Coverage coefficients have a negative signs in both equations, although it has statistical significance only in 
deposit equations it has statistical significance. This means that the increase of the deposits’ coverage did not achieve 
its goal, because the deposits decreased. However, we have to mention that the increase of the DIS coverage amount 
coincided with the recession beginning in 2008 (negative GDP growth and rapidly increased sovereign risk). 
Therefore, our findings may be affected by the high-risk sovereign debt. For this reason we present in detail our 
comments about DIS coverage in our final model which combines DIS coverage and public debt variables.  
According to the macroeconomic variables the increase in GDP growth increases the amount of the deposits, with a 
statistically significant way, and tends
13
 to reduce the interest rates. This means that economic growth enhances the 
depositors’ trust in the Greek banking industry and vice versa.  Inflation has a statistically significant negative impact 
on both dependent variables. This indicates that bank interest rates tend to reflect inflation to a lesser extent than the 
government rate and that inflation reduces the amount of the deposits. The results according to these macroeconomic 
variables do not change significantly in the next models; therefore we do not repeat our comments below. 
4.2 Market Discipline analysis using Economic and Governance Variables 
The next stage of our research is the MD examination with the usage of the governance indicators. Initially we add 
the selected variables individually in order to examine the way each one influences the MD. The results are reported 
in Table 9. 
According to the interest rates equation all the governance variables (CC, RL, RQ,GE) have positive coefficients but 
only the regulatory quality (RQ) has a degree of statistical significance. The interpretation of these results is that the 
more (less) the Greek state is improved in these sections, the higher (lower) are the interest rates that the depositors 
demand. On the contrary, concerning the deposits’ equation all the governance indicators appear to influence them 
negatively and in a statistically significant way. This means that as the Greek governance (CC , RoL, RQ and GE) 
improves, the total deposits are reduced. In other words, these findings support that poor governance performance 
gives greater liquidity to the Greek banking market. 
However, the GIs are not independent from each other. Therefore, in our final models we use the aggregate 
governance indicator (AGI) using the average ranking value of the four GIs. The results are presented in model 6 
(Table 10). 
The AGI has a positive, but slightly not statistically significant, influence on the interest rates. In the deposits 
equation AGI has a negative and statistically significant influence. These results are similar to the previous (models 
                                                          
12 We present both possible assumptions from scientific obligation. Hereafter, in our comments we use the Park’s (2012) 
assumption.  
13 We say tends, because it has no statistical significance. 
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2-5) and support the argument that the improvement of Greek governance tends to increase the interest rates and to 
reduce the deposits (and vice versa). This in turn may mean that Greek authorities may have the motivation not to 
implement strict audits and not to fight the money laundering, because the liquidity in the Greek banking system will 
be reduced. In other words in the Greek banking system there is unaudited capital. If Greek authorities decide to be 
stricter or improve their audits this may lead the capital abroad. Even if this assumption seems extreme, it is 
consistent with Financial Action Task Force (FAFT, 2007) report that Greece fails to combat money laundering. 
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Table 9: Market Discipline results after the introduction of the Governance Indicators 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables Interest Rate ΔDeposits Interest Rate ΔDeposits Interest Rate ΔDeposits Interest Rate ΔDeposits 
Capital to Assets 
-0.068652 
(0.0016)* 
20.20367 
(0.0000)* 
-0.068192 
(0.0016)* 
19.71428 
(0.0000)* 
-0.066799 
(0.0014)* 
20.30705 
(0.0000)* 
-0.066489 
(0.0015)* 
19.96908 
(0.0000)* 
Provisions to Total 
Loans 
-0.402521 
(0.0072)* 
23.32292 
(0.1221) 
-0.394400 
(0.0069)* 
21.20641 
(0.1376) 
-.371507 
(0.0193)** 
16.58365 
(0.2275) 
-0.388622 
(0.0125)** 
20.88539 
(0.1440) 
Cost to Income 
0.035432 
(0.0018)* 
4.11173 
(0.0065)* 
0.041101 
(0.0000)* 
3.836592 
(0.0180)** 
0.024031 
(0.0913)*** 
5.019669 
(0.0001)* 
0.030544 
(0.0025)* 
5.024785 
(0.0016)* 
ROA 
0.176887 
(0.2839) 
29.56925 
(0.1703) 
0.197445 
(0.2023) 
28.15894 
(0.1700) 
0.174755 
(0.3208) 
28.04874 
(0.0979)*** 
0.149427 
(0.3292) 
34.00443 
(0.1031) 
Loan to Deposits 
0.000941 
(0.7724) 
1.010282 
(0.0000)* 
0.000983 
(0.7570) 
1.019295 
(0.0000)* 
0.001105 
(0.7172) 
1.014460 
(0.0000)* 
0.000944 
(0.7739) 
1.017520 
(0.0000)* 
Log(Assets) 
-0.001355 
(0.7228) 
0.644552 
(0.0035)* 
0.000425 
(0.9060) 
0.581763 
(0.0183)** 
-0.005891 
(0.1589) 
0.751488 
(0.0020)* 
-0.002694 
(0.5182) 
0.699617 
(0.0021)* 
DIS 
Coverage 
-5.45E-05 
(0.3866) 
-0.009899 
(0.1031) 
-5.94E-05 
(0.3848) 
-0.012926 
(0.0067)* 
-4.22E-05 
(0.5040) 
-0.007161 
(0.2222) 
-6.18E-05 
(0.4021) 
-0.007893 
(0.0418)** 
GDP Growth 
-0.080946 
(0.3340) 
7.334351 
(0.0445)* 
-0.054323 
(0.4411) 
1.005678 
(0.6956) 
-0.065052 
(0.2649) 
3.204090 
(0.4710) 
-0.083338 
(0.3243) 
7.000742 
(0.0003)* 
Inflation 
-0.580506 
(0.0000)* 
-19.26760 
(0.0031)* 
-0.602023 
(0.0000)* 
-13.80146 
(0.0499)** 
-0.638335 
(0.0000)* 
-8.284456 
(0.0869)*** 
-0.633913 
(0.0000)* 
-8.086363 
(0.1516) 
Control of 
Corruption 
0.000358 
(0.2583) 
-0.081971 
(0.0026)* 
      
Rule of Law   
0.000176 
(0.5134) 
-0.085964 
(0.0495)** 
    
Regulatory Quality     
0.000671 
(0.0350)** 
-0.092381 
(0.0000)* 
  
Government 
Effectiveness 
      
0.000509 
(0.1243) 
-0.113705 
(0.0000)* 
Constant 
-0.009371 
(0.1700) 
-2.550270 
(0.0678)*** 
-0.010593 
(0.1436) 
-0.887378 
(0.7258) 
-0.009222 
(0.1528) 
-2.061175 
(0.0120)* 
-0.010775 
(0.0978)*** 
-0.945782 
(0.2405) 
Number of 
Observations 
104 103 104 103 104 103 104 103 
R-squared 0.520700 0.862371 0.515011 0.860819 0.543435 0.872135 0.526756 0.871133 
Durbin Watson 1.833* 1.785* 1.825* 1.877* 1.856* 1.988* 1.863* 1.877* 
Hausman Test 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Notes: *,**,*** level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively, Random effects (white-cross section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) and 
Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Final Models 
 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables Interest Rate ΔDeposits Interest Rate ΔDeposits 
Capital to Assets 
-0.067072 
(0.0016)* 
20.01945 
(0.0000)* 
-0.066025 
(0.0001)* 
20.24540 
(0.0000)* 
Provisions to Total Loans 
-0.393437 
(0.0144)** 
21.04306 
(0.1428) 
-0.410664 
(0.0109)** 
20.18236 
(0.1513) 
Cost to Income 
0.031303 
(0.0024)** 
4.952855 
(0.0017)* 
0.027286 
(0.0259)** 
4.873179 
(0.0010)* 
ROA 
0.160610 
(0.3206) 
32.46771 
(0.1046) 
0.109822 
(0.3600) 
31.08196 
(0.1053) 
Loan to Deposits 
0.001116 
(0.7206) 
0.992029 
(0.0000)* 
0.005383 
(0.0818)*** 
1.054745 
(0.0000)* 
Log(Assets) 
-0.002668 
(0.5115) 
0.704415 
(0.0024)* 
0.001242 
(0.7841) 
0.735689 
(0.0019)* 
DIS Coverage 
-4.78E-05 
(0.4801) 
-0.010635 
(0.0150)** 
  
DIS Coverage Index   
5.806614 
(0.0000)* 
19.46201 
(0.8556) 
GDP Growth 
-0.074039 
(0.3380) 
5.500725 
(0.0086)* 
-0.047617 
(0.4885) 
5.787029 
(0.0049)* 
Inflation 
-0.613576 
(0.0000)* 
-11.83898 
(0.0342)** 
  
Total Governance Indicators Index 
0.000484 
(0.1250) 
-0.112876 
(0.0000)* 
0.001257 
(0.0283)** 
-0.103380 
(0.0000)* 
Public Debt to GDP   
-0.001123 
(0.0000)* 
-0.024185 
(0.0111)* 
Constant 
-0.010822 
(0.0973)*** 
-0.817196 
(0.2810) 
-0.006471 
(0.2472) 
0.046567 
(0.9070) 
Number of Observations 104 103 104 103 
R-squared 0.525761 0.871425 0.504538 0.872517 
Durbin Watson 1.864* 1.804* 1.765* 1.799* 
Hausman Test 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Notes: *,**,*** level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Random effects (white-cross section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 
Vasileiou /International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 3, No 1, 2014  ISSN: 2147-4486 
107 
 
Moreover, Schneicher and Williams (2013) report that Greece has the highest level of self-employment (48%)
14
 and 
the largest shadow economy in relation to its national income (Table11) among the EU countries which are the 
OECD’s members. This evidence may be another explanation on why stricter audits and anti-money laundering 
policy may lead depositors to not invest their money in the Greek banking system.  
 
Table 11: Size of the shadow economy (% of official GDP) in 21 OECD countries 
 
Source: Schneider F. & Williams C., 2013 “The Shadow Economy”, The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
 
Finally, another assumption which arises from the results and is linked to the bank opacity issue may be the fact that 
the Greek state may not have the willingness to reveal the real financial conditions of the Greek banks. In this case 
the depositors do not know the real risks of their banks. This assumption, as the previous one, is extreme-strange, but 
we should remember that the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), collectively known as the “Troika,” as a condition for the €109 BN assistance package 
stipulated by the 21 July 2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) mandate a Diagnostic Assessment, which was 
conducted by BlackRock
15
. This requirement indicates the European authorities’ do not trust the Greek authorities’ 
                                                          
14 According to the IMF country report No. 13/155 “…self-employed (e.g., doctors, lawyers), and other high wealth individuals 
have continued to stay outside the tax net” (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13155.pdf ). These professionals’ 
deposits have more possibilities to be saved in the Greek banking market if the audits are inadequate. Stricter audits may trigger a 
capital flight.  
15 The report is available on the site of the BOG 
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reports (Greek statistics). This lack of trust in the Greek authorities is similar to the Greek citizens’ perceptions 
according to their state’s governance perfomance, which is expressed with the poor GI results (see the GIs definitions 
in Table 6). The Greek citizens are the main lenders in the Greek banking market and this lack of trust may not 
destabilise the banking market during the normal times, but when the crisis peaks this may lead to deposits outflow, 
which may lead to banking crisis, recession etc. Therefore, as we present above there are quite a few reasons to 
include the GIs in the MD studies. 
 
4.3 Market Discipline analysis using Economic, Quality and Sovereign Debt variables 
As we briefly mention in section 4.1, the DIS coverage findings present negative and statistically significant 
coefficients towards deposits. These results are a bit strange, because they mean that increased coverage tends to 
reduce the deposits. Could these results be related with the timing of the coverage increase and the sovereign debt 
crisis? We point out that the DIS increase was established in November, 2008 and the first signs of crisis occur in 
2010. The negative coefficients in this case may be due to the “bad timing” of the coverage increase, which almost 
coincided with the Greek crisis reveal. In order to immunize the coverage’s influence from the “bad timing” we 
include the Public Debt ratio, which is a sovereign risk indicator and may it reflects the fears of the sovereign risk. 
Therefore, we run model 7
16
 which enables us to examine the public debt’s influence on the banking market. If we do 
not include the public debt ratio in our model, the results and the conclusions according to the DIS’s influence could 
be false.   
Model 7 presents the final equations we suggest that should be applied in MD studies. Findings support that MD in 
Greece is influenced by DIS and the sovereign debt. In the interest rate equation the DIS Index has positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. This means that depositors in Greece take advantage of the increased DIS 
coverage and demand higher interest rates. Maybe for this reason in the banking variables (C/I, ROA, LtD) we find 
superficial MD, because the deposits market may be influenced by the tendency for increased rates due to the DIS. 
The deposits equation presents a positive, but statistically insignificant coefficient, which is an expected result, 
because after the coverage increase we had a year of ‘normal’ economic growth (2009) and a transitional year (2010) 
before the crisis period. So, depositors may feel safe from the increased coverage amount and they do not transfer 
their money from the FIs which take excessive liquidity risks or have poor management performance.  
On the other hand, the excessive public debt presents negative and statistically significant coefficients in deposits 
equation, as expected. When the public debt ratios are reduced more deposits are invested in the Greek banks and vice 
versa. An interesting find that the empirical results offered us is the negative and statistically significant coefficient in 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Diagnostic_Assessment_of_Greek_Banks.pdf 
16 In order to avoid multicollinearity issues we replace the inflation variable with the public debt ratio. Inflation’s influence has 
been analysed in previous section. VIF tests are available upon request. Moreover, we introduce the DIS coverage index (DIS 
Index), which is the ratio of DIS Coverage limit to the GDP per capital and refers to how large a deposit balance is guaranteed by 
the program (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002a)16. We run regressions using the DIS coverage amount and we had similar 
results. We present our results including DIS index as an additional proposal for the way we use DIS variables in a MD study. 
These results are available upon request. Theoretically this index should have positive coefficient towards the deposits equation 
and negative towards interest rate, because as we mentioned before is a premium. 
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the interest rates equation. This means that when the public debt increases, the bank premiums (difference between 
bank interest rates and the T-bills) become lower or turn to negative. This may happens because the increased 
sovereign risk reduces the prospects for credit growth (e.g. healthy and profitable loans/securities etc.) and the banks 
cannot offer increased bank premiums (Figure 3).  
Generally, the influence of DIS, governance indicators and sovereign risk may be described from the following 
assumption: increased DIS coverage and poor performance in GIs may drive in increased bank opacity, impaired MD 
and increased bank risk taking. When the problem comes to the surface this leads to a banking crisis, but it may be 
too late. If DIS cannot cover the cost, then the state should. This may lead to an excessive public debt (especially if a 
bail out procedure is followed, as in the Greek case) that may trigger sovereign debt scenarios, financial stability 
issues and economic crisis.  
Figure 3: The Greek bank premiums in period 2003-13. 
 
Source: Bank of Greece 
There is a viewpoint according to which the Greek public debt triggered the banking crisis. It is out of the scope of 
this analysis to give an extensive answer to this viewpoint, but we may briefly present an alternative explanation 
which starts from this assumption and leads to the same conclusion (to the economic crisis). DIS coverage gives to 
the depositor a ‘psychological safety’. DIS increase depositors’ trust to the Greek banking market and reduces the 
MD. The official tolerance, which is expressed with the poor governance performance, may be connected to the 
increased absorption of the Greek debt from the Greek banks. The increase of the sovereign debt, measured by the 
public debt, spreads the fear to the depositors. The most o the Greek banks are highly leveraged (Table 3) and 
vulnerable in liquidity risk. The increased sovereign risk leads depositors to transfer their money abroad, triggering 
liquidity shortage in banks. The Greek governments provide guarantees (e.g. laws N.3723/2008, N.3864/2010 etc.) in 
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order to absorb this liquidity shortage and in this way raises the Public debt. The GDP continues to fall, from 2008 
even until now, increasing the Public Debt to GDP ratio and the sovereign risk even more. This “chain” of events 
contributes to the “Greek issue”.   
Therefore, from the last section we may conclude that the safety net has two major elements that influence the 
deposits market. The first is the DIS and the second is the country’s robustness. When a crisis bursts these two 
elements should be able to absorb the depositors’ fears in order for financial instability to be avoided. However, in the 
Greek case the two elements seem to “clash” and the final result depends on which of them has the greatest effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Empirical findings support that Market Discipline in the Greek banking system for the period 2002-2010 is 
superficial. The only indicator which has the expected MD results towards the deposits and the interest rates is the 
Capital. Provisions have the opposite from the expected results, while other indicators such as Cost to Income and 
Loan to Deposits ratios present, especially in the deposits equation, signals that the liquidity and the management 
risks are underestimated. Depositor entrust their funds in big banks, therefore in the Greek deposits market the TBTF 
theory is strongly confirmed. Profitability increases the bank deposits and this is confirmed in an almost statistically 
significant level (and vice versa).  
There is a tendency for Greek depositors to be influenced by the increased interest rates and that may be caused from 
the generous DIS coverage. In general, the structure of the Greek DIS (flat rate premiums, no co-insurance, no 
resolution responsibilities etc.) does not strengthen the MD according to the findings of the international empirical 
research. These findings have to be taken into consideration for the establishment of a robust DIS, which at the same 
time it must not reduce the depositors’ MD. If a DIS has these properties it could contribute to the financial 
stabilasation, otherwise the results could be the opposite. 
This study’s empirical findings suggest that in MD studies the public debt variable should be included, because it may 
contribute to avoid possible false assumptions, such as that the increased coverage reduces the deposits (in this case). 
The deposits’ decrease after the coverage’s increase is a strange results and the “bad timing” of the increase may 
influence the results. What may that be? Because the two main components of the safety net are the DIS and a robust 
government. The increased coverage increases the depositors trust and the deposits during the normal times, but when 
the sovereign crisis bursts the fear of bankruptcy highly influences the depositors’ behaviour to the exactly opposite 
way. The final results depend on which of the two influences is stronger. Moreover, during the normal times with the 
increased financial safety the depositors’ major priority may be the higher interest rates, but during the crisis period 
the first priority is the safety (that is why they Greek depositors transfer their funds abroad due to the sovereign risk).  
So, this paper may suggest that when we examine the MD we should use not only a DIS variable, but also a sovereign 
debt variable. The “bad timing” may be the reason that the DIS coefficients are different in models 1-6, in contrast to 
model 7.   
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Generally, the timing may be the reason for many conflicting empirical findings that have been presented in the 
literature. That may be the reason why the most ratios are ambiguous (e.g. during the growth (normal) times increased 
leverage is a good sign, but during the crisis period it may turn to be an indication of failure). Even if the DIS 
structure is effective the government has to be sustainable, otherwise the results are not as the expected, as we present 
in the Greek case. The macroeconomic environment, especially the public debt, influences the depositors’ behaviour 
and sooner or later the economy. For this reason the increase in DIS coverage may not achieve its purpose. The 
economic growth may hide the risk, but not for a long time.  
The ineffectiveness of the Greek state’s mechanisms certainly influence the MD. The negative relation to the deposits 
and the positive (but slightly insignificant) towards the interest rates may suggest that in the Greek economy there 
were incentives of not fighting the illegality. This situation could not be sustainable for a long time, especially into a 
confederation, such as the EMU. Greek (and EU’s) authorities should make structural but careful changes to reverse 
the aforementioned results. The more effective the Greek state will be, the more deposits should gather and if it is 
possible at the lowest cost. However, these structural changes are expensive and time consuming. 
Citizens, which are the main depositors in Greece should be more rigorous in their political criteria (e.g. by 
eliminating clientelism), because governance problems are exposed, sooner or later, in a hard way. This is confirmed 
by the highly negative correlation (r=-0.94) between AGI and public debt, which shows that the poor governance 
leads to increased public debt. If citizens do not try to change their state and eliminate the political pathogenesis, they 
will often experience these problems.  
In our analysis we give great weight to politics. We should not forget that economics is a social science and politics, 
directly or indirectly, plays a crucial role in the economic system. This is why we briefly refer to some structural 
shortages in the EU and propose some policies according to our findings. EU has membership criteria (political, 
economic and legal) during the accession process. One of the membership criteria is that Government Debt as 
percentage of GDP should not be more than 60%. Why is Greek public debt always above this threshold? Also, why 
does Greece systemically violate the 3% limit on budget deficits17? An EU institutional problem is not whether 
Greece is corrupt, but whether there wasw any control for corruption, rule of law, etc. after Greece’s entrance to the 
Eurozone. 
In order to avoid financial instabilities EU authorities should introduce multinational controls in order to minimize 
bank opacity, governance shortage and the reduction of the excessive sovereign debt. The Greek case may be used as a 
lesson which shows us how delayed measures could threaten stability. Concerning the EU’s long term stability, the 
accession criteria must be revised and all countries must be supervised continuously and effectively (and not only 
during the accession period). Corruption and inefficiency issues, which are commonly identified as the most 
significant reasons that contributed to the Greek (and the Cypriot) problem (Vasileiou, 2014)), are not created 
suddenly. These inefficiencies were exposed when the country applied for financial aid; by then it was too late.  
Further research on this specific area of study may be useful in order to draw more empirical conclusions on whether 
sovereign risk and governance performance should be included in MD studies. Moreover, the European crisis offers 
                                                          
17 Katsimi and Moutos (2010) present these issues in an interesting overview of the EMU and the Greek crisis. 
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scholars and regulators the “opportunity” to examine in which countries the MD is weak and if this leads to financial 
instability. These findings may be useful for the establishment of a new EMU institutional framework that will provide 
stonger financial safety, contributing to the long term financial stability, not only to each country individually, but also 
to the EMU as a total. 
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